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after Pearl Harbor revolved around the fact that we refused to consider her as an enemy, regardless of the fact that the Thai Government had declared war against us on January 25, 1942. We did not declare war, but took the position that the Government at Bangkok, under the domination of the Japanese, did not represent the desires of its people; and we continued to recognize the Thai Minister in Washington as the Minister of his country.

Our desire being to see Thailand restored as an independent nation, we held discussions on this point with the British Government in 1944. The British, however, stated that they regarded Thailand as an enemy country which had to work its passage toward independence. Foreign Secretary Eden assured us that Britain desired the ultimate restoration of Thai sovereignty, but he made reservations with regard to security and economic collaboration by Thailand and to strategic guarantees in the Kra Isthmus which cuts across Thailand.

We on our part agreed that the new territories Thailand had acquired through Japanese "mediation," principally from French Indo-China, should be restored to their former owners, although this was to be without prejudice to eventual adjustments or transfers of territories by orderly, peaceful processes.

The President requested the Department on November 3, 1944, to instruct American representatives and to inform the British, French, and Dutch Governments, that the United States expected to be consulted on any arrangements as to the future of Southeast Asia. This included Thailand.

As I left office, our policy with regard to Thailand was to favor its restoration as a sovereign country, with an independent Government representing the free will of the people. We did not recognize the Government then existing. We were sympathetic to the "Free Thai Movement" which had been started here and in other countries, but we did not intend to make any political commitment to it, since we desired to leave the choice of government to the Thai people themselves.

With regard to Japan, the work of the State Department during my last years in office followed three main lines. The first was an unceasing effort to obtain humane treatment for prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese hands and to hasten the repatriation of these civilians. The second was a constant use of diplomacy to concert with our Allies all efforts toward prosecuting the war in the Orient to victory. The third was to prepare a plan for the postwar treatment of Japan.

Through the Swiss Government, which ably represented our interests toward Japan, we made literally scores of representations to Japan to induce her to accord proper treatment to Americans in her hands. Right after Pearl Harbor we took care to give the Japanese in our hands humane treatment, hoping that the Japanese Government might follow our example. Although Japan was not a signatory of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, we obtained from that Government a commitment to apply the provisions of the convention to American prisoners of war and, so far as adaptable, to civilian internees.

When, however, the first group of Americans repatriated from Japan, including Ambassador Grew, arrived on the first exchange voyage of the *Gripsholm*, they told stories of outrageous treatment by the Japanese. We made their accounts the basis of a vigorous, comprehensive protest to Japan.

As succeeding reports came in, it was obvious that Japan was flagrantly violating its commitment to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The hideous treatment of many American prisoners of war and civilian internees revealed a barbarism among the Japanese military which shocked the civilized world.

This mistreatment reached one of many climaxes when the Japanese executed the American aviators who fell into their hands after General James Doolittle's raid over Tokyo. We made this the subject of a vigorous protest on April 12, 1943. Calling again upon Japan to carry out its agreement to observe the Geneva Convention, we bluntly warned that the United States Government would punish all Japanese officers who participated in such atrocities.

I wish I could say that the many steps we took, and the valid support we received from the Swiss, had some effect. It did not seem that they had; Japanese barbarism was too deeply rooted; and our protests were still continuing when I left office. We were able, however, to build up a vast record of substantial evidence against individual Japanese which was of later aid in bringing these criminals to the punishment they amply deserved.

In 1943, and particularly in 1944, my associates and I devoted much time to the subject of the future treatment of Japan as a whole. We had frequent discussions among ourselves and with the War Department. In May, 1944, we in the State Department arrived at certain basic conclusions which we submitted to the War Department.

One was that Japan should be treated as a whole; it should not be

partitioned, although the territories it had wrested from other nations should be returned to them.

Another was that the Japanese Government as a unit should be suspended during the period of armed occupation. That is, its policy-making functions should cease. The Privy Council, the Cabinet, the Diet, the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the Supreme Military Council should go. The Ministries of War, Navy, Munitions, and Greater East Asia Affairs should be liquidated; routine administrative functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be performed under the direction of Allied Civil Affairs officers, with policy matters referred to the State Department.

Administrative Departments, such as the Ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, Justice, Transportation and Communications, Agriculture and Commerce, Education and Welfare, could continue under Civil Affairs officers in the top policy-making positions. We also believed that the municipal and prefectural administrative machinery could be retained, at first under Civil Affairs supervision.

A third point in our thinking was that all the principally interested United Nations who had taken part in the war against Japan, should participate in the occupation and control of Japan. We felt it was undesirable to assume the sole onus for future Japanese resentment. We believed it more effective to show the Japanese people, through the presence of other nationalities in the forces of occupation and control, that the condemnation of Japanese aggression was world-wide. We wished to see the presence in Japan of the armed forces of other nations, even if only token forces, and we were particularly anxious to have forces of other Asiatic peoples in evidence, such as Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos, so as to impress the Japanese with the fact that this had been not merely a white man's war against them.

We divided our thinking with regard to Japan into three postwar periods. During the first, comparatively short, period, Japan should be deprived of her prewar colonial empire and be completely demilitarized.

During the second, and longer, period, we proposed the establishment of permanent bases from which Japan could be militarily policed so as to prevent a revival of Japanese aggression; the establishment of control systems to prevent Japanese rearmament and the development of a war potential; the encouragement of democratic thought, with the help of Japanese moderate elements; the elimination of ultranationalistic organizations; and Japan's gradual participation in world economy.

During the third period, of indefinite duration, we proposed the establishment of a Japanese Government that would carry out its proper functions in a peaceful manner.

The Emperor of Japan and his future naturally occupied a considerable portion of our thinking. Should the institution of the Emperor, hallowed in Japanese history, be continued, or should it be abolished? The opinion of the State Department on this point was requested at various times by the War and Navy Departments. It proved to be one of our most difficult questions to answer, because it was impossible at the time to prophesy accurately the effects of an attempt by the United Nations to eliminate the institution of the Emperor.

We summed up our conclusions, however, and gave our recommendations in a memorandum on May 9, 1944. In this we pointed out that, since the Japanese then showed an almost fanatical devotion to the Emperor, an attempt from the outside to abolish the institution of the Emperor would probably be ineffective. The mere dethronement of the Emperor would not abolish the Emperorship if the Japanese were determined to maintain it, and an indefinite military occupation of Japan might be necessary if the United Nations wished to prevent its revival. We called attention to the unique position of the Japanese Emperor in that he was considered as the source, sacred and inviolable, from which all authority emanated.

Accepted governmental procedure had allowed the Emperorship to be made an instrument of the Japanese military, we pointed out; and accordingly this close relationship would probably have to be severed if we were to wipe out militarism in Japan. In any event, the supreme authority in Japan must be the Allied military Government.

If the Emperor were retained, we said, there were three choices—redelegate to him none, all, or only some of his functions. We argued against the first in that it might create a difficult situation for the occupation authorities. Japanese functionaries considered the throne as the source of their authority, and they might refuse to serve under foreign masters if the Emperor were deprived of his rights of sovereignty. We questioned whether a sufficient number of Allied Civil Affairs personnel could ever be trained to operate by themselves the entire administration of Japanese government and the essential functions of Japanese economy.

We argued against the second on the grounds that it might infringe too much on the authority of the occupation forces, it might imply that

the latter were supporting the continuance of the throne, and it would probably encounter the opposition of American public opinion.

We felt that the third choice, to redelegate to the Emperor some of his functions, offered the best possibilities. The Allied governor would permit the Emperor to exercise only those functions that related to the assignment of administrative duties to subordinate officials. Without impairing the essential authority of the theater commander, this would tend to assure the good behavior of the Japanese people and to keep in office the maximum number of Japanese officials willing to serve directly under the supervision of Civil Affairs officers.

We did not think the Japanese would interpret this procedure as support of the Emperorship and its symbolic value, in view of the fact that foreign military forces would have apprehended the imperial family and would be using some of the Emperor's functions for their own ends. Moreover, the Japanese would be uncertain as to the eventual disposition of the Emperor.

It might well be possible, we thought, for the Civil Affairs administration to diminish even the limited use it might make of the institution of the Emperor as the administrative machinery of military government functioned more effectively. We considered this desirable politically. And, if a substantial movement developed among the Japanese people to abolish the imperial institution, the Allied military authorities should take no action against that movement, except to maintain law and order, and should cease to utilize the Emperor as a political instrument.

Generally, we recommended that the Allied military authorities adopt as flexible a course as possible. If they decided to permit the Emperor to exercise certain limited functions, we then made five recommendations.

The first was that the Emperor should be kept in seclusion, after being removed from the Imperial Palace and taken to a location which was comparatively easy to guard. But his personal advisers should have reasonable access to him, and he should be accorded normal courtesies. The Japanese people could therefore be assured of the Emperor's safety and welfare and of the fact that he was under surveillance.

The second was that the authority and responsibility of the theater commander should supersede that of all officials and organs in the occupied territory. The military governor would permit only those functions of the Emperor to be exercised which related to the assignment of administrative duties to subordinate officials. He should suspend those functions of the Emperor relating to the enactment of laws and to the armed forces. This

would show to the Japanese people that the authority of the occupation government was superior to that of the Emperor.

The third was that, if retaining the Emperorship did not facilitate the use of Japanese personnel under the supervision of Civil Affairs officers, it might become advantageous to suspend all the functions of the Emperor, but the occupation authorities would have to be prepared to take charge of the actual operation of all Japanese governmental activities. We requested that, before such action were taken, the State Department be given an opportunity to express its opinion.

The fourth was that, if a portion of Japan were occupied for any length of time prior to unconditional surrender of the entire country, the occupation authorities should be prepared to operate directly most of the functions of government in the occupied area. This for the reason that it would probably be difficult to obtain the services of any Japanese officials of significance in that area.

The fifth was that the occupation authorities, in all their treatment of and contact with the Emperor, should refrain from any action that would imply recognition of or support for the Japanese concept that the Emperor was different from and superior to other temporal rulers, that he was of divine origin and capacities, that he was sacrosanct, and that he was indispensable. They should permit absolute freedom of discussion of political as well as other subjects, except where there might be incitement to breaches of the peace.

In general, we felt we should not make advance commitments that would prejudice the situation in favor of the Emperor institution, or against it. We did not want to come out against the institution lest this give the Japanese militarists live coals to blow upon and bring up a flame of last-man resistance. Nor did we wish to come out for the institution lest this discourage whatever popular movement there might be in Japan to erase it. *"Don't do that"*

Just before Secretary of State Byrnes left for the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, he telephoned me at my apartment and gave me the substance of a draft statement which he said President Truman had given him. This proposed statement, for issue by the United States, Britain, and Russia at the Potsdam Conference, contained a declaration by the Allies to Japan that the Emperor institution would be preserved if Japan would make peace. Byrnes asked my opinion. He said that high officials of the State, War, and Navy Departments had approved it. *Byrnes*

I replied that, since he was leaving in a few minutes, there was no

time to write anything for him, but that the statement seemed too much like appeasement of Japan, especially after the resolute stand we had maintained on unconditional surrender. I pointed out that, as it was worded, it seemed to guarantee continuance not only of the Emperor but also of the feudal privileges of a ruling caste under the Emperor. I said that the Emperor and the ruling class must be stripped of all extraordinary privileges and placed on a level before the law with everybody else.

I then sent Byrnes a cable on July 16, through the courtesy of Under Secretary Grew, to outline my thoughts in further detail. I said that the support of the statement by the chief people in the State, War, and Navy Departments called for the most serious consideration. Nevertheless I pointed out that the central point calculated to create serious difference was in the paragraph relating to a proposed declaration by the Allies now—I underlined "now"—that the Emperor and his monarchy would be preserved in the event of an Allied victory. The proponents of this promise, I added, believed that somehow the influences and persons who paid allegiance to the Emperor and his religious status would fight and resist less hard and so save Allied lives and shorten the war.

The other side, however, I concluded, was that no person knew how the proposal would work out. The militarists would try hard to interfere. Also, should it fail, the Japanese would be encouraged and terrible political repercussions would follow in the United States. I therefore asked whether it would be well first to await the climax of Allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war.

The following day I received a message from Secretary Byrnes agreeing that the statement should be delayed, and that, when it was issued, it should not contain this commitment with regard to the Emperor.

When the Potsdam Declaration concerning Japan was issued, it contained no commitment with regard to the Emperor. The Japanese Government stated it would accept the Potsdam Declaration provided the right of the Emperor to rule were accepted. In line with the conclusions we had previously reached at the State Department, however, President Truman and Secretary Byrnes agreed to retain the Emperor only if his right to rule were subject to the Allied Command in carrying out the terms of surrender agreed to at Potsdam. The Japanese agreed.

The Potsdam agreement differed from the State Department recommendations made under me in that it permitted the continuance of the Japanese Government as such. We had recommended that certain sections of that Government be retained for administrative purposes; but at Pots-

dam it was agreed that the Government as a whole should continue along with its policy-making functions. Our recommendation that Allied Civil Affairs officers be stationed in all Government Departments likewise was not followed.

Concerning the vast area of the Southwest Pacific, my associates and I had been doing considerable thinking and, along with the President, had arrived at certain conclusions during my last years in office. This area embraced such important territories as the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, and could be taken to include Malaya and French Indo-China.

These enormous lands entered into the intensive discussions we had been holding on the subject of dependent peoples. Without being specifically mentioned, they were included in the projects I had presented to the British and Russians under that heading.

We believed that the time had come when all parent countries should begin to plan and prepare for the self-government of these peoples, to be given them when they were ready for and worthy of it. Before us we always had the example of the Philippines, whom the United States had been preparing for independence almost since the day of our acquisition of the islands, and for whom an independence date had been formally set by national legislation in the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934.

The President was in thorough agreement with our proposals. He himself entertained strong views on independence for French Indo-China. That French dependency stuck in his mind as having been the springboard for the Japanese attack on the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. He could not but remember the devious conduct of the Vichy Government in granting Japan the right to station troops there, without any consultation with us but with an effort to make the world believe we approved.

From time to time the President had stated forthrightly to me and to others his view that French Indo-China should be placed under international trusteeship shortly after the end of the war, with a view to its receiving full independence as soon as possible.

When British Foreign Secretary Eden came to the United States in March, 1943, he and I attended a conference with the President at the White House on March 27. William Strang (Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office), Harry Hopkins, Welles, British Ambassador Halifax, and Ambassador Winant, who was here on leave from London, were also present.

One of the first subjects brought up was whether China was to be